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Political Economy 
Imad El-Anis 
Jordan’s survival and emergence as a stable and peaceful country has surprised many observers. Since 
its creation, this small desert kingdom has been regarded as less powerful, less capable and less 
significant than almost all other states in the Middle East. Yet most of these observations have been 
predicated on an assessment of Jordan’s political and military standing in the region. A more complete 
assessment of contemporary Jordan needs to take into account its political economy—indeed doing 
so might help to explain just how it has managed to grow into the established state that it is albeit one 
that still faces many developmental and security challenges. Jordan is an important country, and it 
offers a very interesting case of the ways in which modern global political and economic processes 
interact with local political economy to shape individual states/markets. It is a small country by most 
interpretations and faces immense structural limitations, yet under King Abdullah II (as under his 
father, the late King Hussein) Jordan endures as its political economy evolves in response to an ever-
dynamic set of challenges.  
This chapter first discusses relevant concepts used to explain the most prevalent challenges and 
limitations to Jordan’s economic development. This allows us to contextualize the discussion on the 
key features of Jordan’s political economy in the 21st century. It then outlines the ways in which 
national policy-making is made in Jordan and how this is impacted by and in turn impacts on the main 
political and economic issues facing the kingdom. As a discussion of the political economy of modern 
Jordan would not be complete without considering energy insecurity and freshwater scarcity, the 
chapter then turns to these areas. Energy insecurity and freshwater scarcity tell a great deal about the 
nature of Jordan’s political economy, representing Jordan’s most pressing security concerns and 
demonstrating the state’s pragmatism in its policy responses to developmental challenges. It then 
moves on to a discussion of the embedding of economic neoliberalism, led by the government and 
King Abdullah II in particular. Neoliberal policies have become prevalent in Jordanian decision-making 
circles and have transformed Jordan’s political economy. Final thoughts on Jordan’s prospects 
conclude the chapter.  
Structural challenges and limitations to development 
For the most part, Jordan is generally regarded as a small state, and this often leads to assumptions 
about its economic, political and military capabilities. Usually, this means that Jordan is a vulnerable 
and rather weak state that has limited domestic capacities and is largely restricted in its ability to act 
on the international scene. It is essential to note that there are several ways of defining smallness in 
the context of states, and there are many competing approaches to identifying which states should 
be classed as small, and different ways of explaining what this means for their behavior. One can 
identify two broad categories that are relevant to a study of the political economy of Jordan. In the 
first instance, scholars working in various fields, including international relations, international 
political economy, comparative politics, and security studies, have used material realities-based 
methodologies to define smallness. Here, the nature of a state is measured by focusing on observable 
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factors such as the size of a country’s territory, its overall population, size of its GDP, number and 
technological advancement of military forces and so on. Using this approach, one can conclude that 
Jordan is a small state. Jordan’s total sovereign territory is only 89,341 sq.km (for comparison, the 
USA’s total sovereign territory is 9,833,520 sq.km). At the end of 2017 Jordan’s population is 
approximately 10 million (including significant numbers of Syrian and Iraqi refugees that may add up 
to 1.5 million) and its GDP is approximately US$39.5 billion – only good enough to rank 91st out of 191 
countries according to the International Monetary Fund. The World Bank classifies Jordan as a lower 
middle-income country, as is demonstrated by its relatively low US$5092 per capita income (which 
has remained largely unchanged since the 2008-2009 financial crisis). The Jordanian Ministry of 
Defense states that the Jordan Armed Forces total a little over 110,000 active personnel with 
approximately 65,000 personnel in reserve. Furthermore, Jordan’s military capabilities are modest in 
terms of its equipment, although Jordan is well-regarded in the region for its counter-terrorism 
expertise.  
The second approach to assessing smallness focuses on non-material factors including the discursive 
roots of smallness and the social constructs of what this means for national capabilities. Here, the 
ways in which national characteristics (including the material realities mentioned above) are identified 
and interpreted is important. If Jordan is compared with Israel using a material realities-based 
approach, for example, one might regard both as small states (Israel is, after all, far smaller 
geographically at 20,770 square kilometers and has a population of less than nine million), yet it 
appears far more confident and internationally capable in its policy-making. Jordan is a small state, 
not necessarily because of its small geographical size, population and economy. Rather, it is a small 
state because these material realities are perceived by Jordanian decision-makers (and perhaps the 
broader population) as posing significant challenges to its development and as placing severe 
limitations on what Jordan as a national polity and market can achieve. Any consideration of its 
political economy must take this into account alongside the following structural challenges.  
Jordan possesses very limited reserves of almost all of the natural resources that are essential for a 
modern economy to thrive. Created out of a largely empty and barren stretch of land between the 
Syrian Desert and the Arabian Peninsula, this small kingdom has had to rely on supplies of fuel, food, 
chemicals and metals among other products from external sources. Unlike all of its neighbors (apart 
from Palestine) which possess significant amounts of crude oil and/or natural gas, no such reserves 
have ever been found in Jordanian territory—an unfortunate and unintended outcome of the ways in 
which Jordan’s borders were formalized under the UN mandate (Joffe, 2002). Therefore, the country 
has had to rely on the importation of approximately 97 per cent of its energy demands from 
neighboring countries throughout its history. Recent imports of oil and gas have tended to cost Jordan 
approximately US$3.5 billion per year—the government is the initial purchaser of fuel, which it then 
sells on to the domestic market. Crude oil, totaling approximately 108,000 barrels per day, has 
traditionally been imported from Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (with Iraq being the most significant 
supplier of oil in the 1990s and early 2000s until Iraqi production was halted after the US-led invasion 
and occupation). In more recent years, natural gas from Egypt has formed the mainstay of Jordanian 
energy imports, and has amounted to 2.72 billion cubic meters per year. Energy security and its role 
in the broader political economy of Jordan are discussed further below.  
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Perhaps the most pressing resource scarcity faced by Jordanians is the lack of freshwater (Cammett 
et al., 2015: 199-229). The UN designated freshwater poverty line is 1000 cubic meters per person per 
year, yet Jordan only possesses 123.4 cubic meters per person per year of renewable freshwater 
resources. In other words, the amount of renewable freshwater supplies available for drinking, food 
production, industry and household use is not enough to maintain a high quality of life. The UN’s Food 
and Agriculture Organization ranks Jordan as one of the five most freshwater poor countries in the 
world. Most precipitation and all of the major river systems (for example, the Jordan River) are found 
in the north-west of Jordan, and approximately 85 per cent of Jordan’s territory receives very little or 
no rainfall at all. This limits the amount of arable land available for use, and that which is available is 
increasingly being lost to urban sprawl (with the majority of people living in Jordan found in the north-
west, largely because that is where the limited freshwater sources are found) and degradation due to 
overuse and pollution. Industrial production is also hindered by the lack of available freshwater for 
manufacturing processes.  
An oft-overlooked or downplayed structural limitation to Jordan’s development is unemployment and 
underemployment. The official unemployment rate recorded by the Jordanian government is 16.5 per 
cent (2017) of the total working-age population. This is a relatively high rate in itself and results in two 
profound and seemingly insurmountable problems. Firstly, a large proportion of the population is 
unable to earn a living wage to support themselves and their dependents which hinders efforts at both 
poverty alleviation and human development. And secondly, it means that the Jordanian labor market 
is saturated which drives down salaries—this inescapable fact is evident around the world where there 
is a surplus of labor. One can also question the official government figures on unemployment as it may 
be advantageous to report lower than real levels of unemployment as observers in Jordan form 
opinions on governmental performance. Unofficial estimates put the unemployment rate at closer to 
30 per cent.  
Furthermore, the problem of underemployment is rarely considered, and is not often reported. Out 
of the 83.5 per cent of the working age population (2017) that are regarded as being employed, a 
significant number (although no official figures exist) are likely to be employed in only seasonal, casual 
(day-to-day), or part-time work meaning they have little job security and, more often than not, very 
low incomes. These dual problems of unemployment and underemployment are compounded by the 
lack of social welfare in Jordan. The government does not offer those who are unemployed, for 
example, sufficient support and because of the very constrained governmental budget as Jordan has 
long run a budget deficit, which in 2017 stood at US$2.653 billion, equivalent to 6.5 per cent of GDP. 
In other words, the Jordanian state is not rich enough to provide its citizens with a sufficient social 
welfare safety net. Unemployment and underemployment pose even more serious obstacles to 
development when in 2017 approximately 55 per cent of the population was recorded as under 25-
years old, and unemployment and underemployment are most prevalent in the 15 to 30-year age 
range. Jordan has an expanding, youthful and educated population that faces increasingly inadequate 
avenues for employment.  
Poverty in Jordan is an enduring problem, with 2017 estimates suggesting that 14.2 per cent of the 
population lives below the poverty line (which the World Bank puts at US$1.90 per person per day). 
Again, this already high figure is likely to be slightly conservative. A significant proportion of Syrian 
refugees in Jordan are likely to not be recorded in official surveys of household poverty, for example. 
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Having such a large proportion of the population below the poverty line leads to significant structural 
limitations of the economy. In the first instance, those living below the poverty line are largely 
restricted from developing their human capital, for example, by not having access to suitable 
education and training. To compound this problem further, a substantial proportion of the population 
lives just above the poverty line and can be severely impacted by economic turbulence both at the 
domestic level and in the broader global economy. This happened in the aftermath of both the 1989 
Jordanian financial crisis and the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and recession, where spikes in 
households living below the poverty line were witnessed.  
Since the 1970s the government has attempted to reduce poverty levels but Jordan has an enduring 
budgetary-deficit problem leaving little resources to effectively combat the root causes of poverty. 
The government’s budget has been further affected by the adoption of neoliberal economic policies 
and their accompanying macro-economic structural adjustments (such as cutting subsidies on basic 
food stuffs and fuel) which have been driven both by domestic factors (King Abdullah II, for example, 
has been supportive of Washington Consensus neoliberal economic policies) and external forces (for 
example, the IMF and World Bank which have supported the Jordanian government financially since 
1989 but have demanded wide-ranging reforms in return that focus on reducing government 
expenditures). Jordan’s situation is also problematic due to its persistent trade deficit which it has 
experienced for much of the past few decades. Since 2000, each year has seen a significant deficit in 
Jordan’s current account with year-on-year growth in this deficit seen between 2002 and 2014. 
Increases in hydrocarbon prices as well as many consumer prices on the global market have seen 
Jordan’s trade deficit climb to over $8.05 billion in 2016, up from $2.26 billion in 2000 (see Table 1 
below). These two deficits (budget and trade) have been offset to an extent by official external aid 
and grant support coming from donor states and international organizations. This form of external 
income has grown from $550 million in 2000 to over $2.74 billion in 2016 (growth that has somewhat 
mirrored the government’s growing budget deficit). The USA is the largest donor to the Jordanian 
government with total US aid totaling $1.522 billion in 2017 (US aid to Jordan has consistently topped 
$1 billion in recent years). Overall, the twin deficit problem coupled with high levels of foreign 
assistance has increased Jordan’s dependence on external actors for its economic well-being.  
 
Table 1: Macro-economic indicators (budget deficit, trade deficit, and external aid & grant income)  
Year Budget Deficit (% of 
GDP) 
Trade Deficit (US$ 
billions) 
Aid & Grant Income 
(US$ billions) 
2000 +1.14 -2.26 0.55 
2001 +1.04 -2.25 0.45 
2002 -0.67 -1.83 0.56 
2003 +1.41 -2.14 1.32 
2004 +1.49 -3.4 0.6 
2005 -2.79 -5.15 0.71 
2006 -4.2 -5.01 0.57 
2007 -5.1 -6.31 0.63 
2008 -2.2 -6.53 0.73 
2009 -8.9 -5.4 0.74 
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2010 -5.6 -5.49 0.95 
2011 -6.8 -7.56 0.97 
2012 -8.3 -8.67 1.58 
2013 -5.5 -9.94 1.4 
2014 -2.3 -9.46 2.7 
2015 -3.5 -8.6 2.15 
2016 -3.2 -8.05 2.74 
Source: World Bank Data Bank; IMF; Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. 
 
Political and economic policy-making in a reformist monarchy  
Since independence, Jordanian politics have ebbed and flowed in different directions with national 
interests, national institutions, foreign and domestic policies and the politics of decision-making 
changing over time. Yet in some ways governance in Jordan has also been remarkably consistent. King 
Abdullah I (ruled 1946-1951)oversaw the emergence of Jordan as an absolute monarch (Salibi, 1998: 
73-91), but governance in the early era was also characterized by an appreciation of the importance 
of dialogue with established communities (namely the East Bank tribes and small Circassian 
community centered around Amman) that would come to form the backbone of monarchical support 
(Ryan, 2002). By no means did engaging with local communities equate to transparent and 
accountable government, although Jordan did have a functioning parliament in the 1940s and 1950s 
which had, by the regional standards of the time, relatively significant powers and functions.  
Governance has continued to reflect this original structure and since the late 1980s, in particular, the 
Jordanian government has engaged with political reforms aimed at placating an increasingly restless 
and demanding population that seeks greater governmental accountability and greater 
representation for the masses. These attempts at democratization (there are many forms of 
democratic governance, and the Jordanian conception of democracy may differ to that of other 
communities) have had a mixed record and have taken place at varying speeds and with significantly 
different levels of governmental sincerity. In 1989, for example, in the wake of the most damaging 
economic downturn in Jordan’s history up to that point King Hussein orchestrated rather important 
reforms allowing for the legalization of more political parties, the holding of free and fair elections, 
and the re-establishment of parliament. However, these reforms were almost entirely rolled back by 
the mid-1990s in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the subsequent UN-
sanctioned war to liberate Kuwait in 1991, and the emergence of the Palestinian-Israeli and broader 
Arab-Israeli peace process. These events had a galvanizing effect on large parts of Jordanian society 
which subsequently meant that politics in Jordan became less predictable. Under these circumstances, 
King Hussein and most of those in government argued (Robins, 2004: 187-190) that greater political 
stability was needed to steer the country through such a difficult time. 
By the time King Abdullah II ascended to the throne in February 1999 there was once again significant 
pressure from the street for political reform that would allow for ordinary Jordanians to participate in 
governance at the local and national levels. King Abdullah II has largely been regarded as a reformist 
leader who has pursued political reform (reference). However, his democratic credentials have not 
been free from criticism and observers have claimed that under his reign has at best formed a 
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democratic façade, and at worst become an entrenched police state with the discourse of political 
reform used to placate external backers like the US and European Union members (Ryan, 2014). King 
Abdullah II inherited a kingdom that, for the first time since the 1940s, had engaged in serious political 
reform (during 1989-1991) and which had a population that had gained significant experience in civil 
society activities through the 1990s. Yet, given the domestic and international political and economic 
challenges discussed above and later in this chapter, political reform in Jordan has faced many 
obstacles and there has been a great deal of uncertainty in Jordanian politics.  
As stated above, one can identify some consistencies in governance in Jordan. In particular, for 
virtually since independence, budgetary stability has been directly tied to regime survival. In short, 
securing sufficient funds to pay the government’s bills year-on-year has perhaps been the most 
immediate consideration of consecutive governments and the monarchy itself (Brand, 1994). It is quite 
easy to argue that socio-economic interests have been subservient to more traditional notions of 
national security, regime survival and regional stability. However, it is more accurate to note that, 
especially given the accelerating processes of globalization, regional economic transformation and the 
changing socio-economic characteristics of society itself, the regime has long been focused on political 
economy-oriented domestic and foreign policy-making that has at its heart, budgetary security and 
regime survival. Directly informing these two considerations are energy security, freshwater security, 
and the modernization of the Jordanian economy through the creation of a business-friendly and 
competitive environment.  
Energy insecurity and policy responses 
Jordan’s lack of energy resources has made it rather energy insecure. Soon after King Abdullah II 
ascended the throne in 1999 the government began to formulate policies to diversify its energy 
supplies by importing its fuel needs from several sources at one time, rather than maintaining the 
long-standing policy of relying on bilateral agreements with neighboring states. This change in policy 
has largely been unsuccessful. Iraq through the 1990s, for example, supplied Jordan with almost all of 
its crude oil needs at heavily discounted prices well below market prices in return for Jordanian 
political and economic support. Aqaba, Jordan’s only port, for example was used as a main entry point 
for goods destined for the Iraqi market while Basra, Iraq’s main port, was inoperable. 
Jordan’s energy vulnerability stems not only from its lack of domestic energy sources, but also from 
its over-reliance on single external sources in which the Jordanian government has had very little 
ability to influence the stability of its energy supplies. The government vociferously protested against 
the build-up to the 2003 Iraq war on humanitarian and legal grounds, while at the same time rather 
quietly, but more whole-heartedly, protested on the grounds that such a war would likely severely 
damage the Jordanian economy, not the least through cutting off its energy supply and forcing 
consumers in Jordan to pay global market prices for fuel. Of course, the government was unable to 
affect the outbreak of the war and the economy was subsequently negatively impacted by soaring 
fuel bills.  
Within a few years the government had signed an agreement with Cairo for the purchase of Egyptian 
natural gas in large quantities through the so-called Arab Peace Pipeline that runs through the Sinai 
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Peninsula and branches out to Israel and Jordan. The government also invested heavily in converting 
Jordan’s power plants from oil-based to gas-based power generation.   
But this attempt to switch from Iraqi oil to Egyptian gas also proved fragile and has done little to 
alleviate Jordan’s energy insecurity. The preferential agreement signed between Jordan and Egypt 
came under heavy scrutiny following the fall of the Mubarak regime in February 2011. At the heart of 
the matter was the concern Egyptians had about the fact that Jordanians were paying less for Egyptian 
gas than Egyptians themselves were being charged. Through the first half of 2011 the Jordanian and 
Egyptian (transitional) governments sought to renegotiate the terms of the agreement, concluding in 
July 2011 a new deal stipulating that Jordan would receive supplies of Egyptian gas for 12 years, but 
at a higher price than had been agreed in the previous treaty. However, Jordan’s vulnerability to 
external shocks was once again demonstrated following the new agreement when a series of bomb 
attacks on the gas pipeline in the Sinai Peninsula led to persistent halts in gas supplies to Jordan – 
which the government estimated cost the economy upwards of US$3 million for each day that the 
supply was shut off. Since 2012, Egyptian natural gas supplies have been somewhat more stable, but 
confidence in Egypt as a stable supplier of energy has dwindled because of instability in the Sinai 
Peninsula which has repeatedly hindered gas supplies through the pipe network there, and the post-
2011 Egyptian governments’ reneging on previous agreements, encouraging the Jordanian 
government to pursue other ways to secure its energy needs.  
Jordan’s experiences of the Arab Spring in 2011 also affected energy security. While Jordan did not 
face the same levels of instability experienced in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, the pro-
democracy/opposition movement did place sufficient pressure on the government to encourage it to 
act on political and economic reforms. King Abdullah II was compelled to engage in serious dialogue 
with a wide range of segments of Jordanian society. At the very center of the Jordanian Arab Spring 
experience was the demand for better living conditions, better pay, more jobs and a better general 
economic situation. These demands remain and evident in the concerns of ordinary Jordanians is the 
rising price of food and fuel. The government finds itself between the proverbial rock and hard place, 
faced with pressure for lower fuel prices (from electricity to fuel for cars) from a restless population, 
and the high price of externally-sourced fuel.  
King Abdullah II views securing Jordan’s energy supplies as of the greatest importance. He has 
consistently directed the government to develop policy responses that will ensure Jordan has stable, 
reliable and reasonably priced supplies of energy for the long-term (El-Anis, 2016: 528-547). The 
resulting policy direction has been to develop domestic sources of energy. Jordan is extremely 
resource scarce and does not possess any crude oil and has negligible reserves of natural gas. While 
there are some supplies of shale oil, estimated at over 65 billion tons, these are currently not readily 
recoverable in large quantities at viable prices. Renewable energy initiatives have been developed and 
both the public and private sectors have shown some encouraging signs; for example, in November 
2017 the government coordinated with the German government to oversee the completion of the 
world’s largest solar power plant within a refugee camp, when it switched on a 12.9 megawatt solar 
plant at the Zaatari refugee camp that, at the time, housed over 80,000 Syrian refugees. In the same 
month, the technology group Wartsila signed an agreement to build Jordan’s largest photovoltaic solar 
plant – a 52 megawatt plant just to the East of Amman. Overall, renewable energy is set to constitute 
10 per cent of Jordan’s total energy mix by 2020.  
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Wind energy is still in a relative infancy but there are plans to expand on the country’s three current 
wind farms. These are located at Ibrahimya (a 0.32-megawatt plant 80 kilometer north of Amman), 
Hofa (a 1.125-megawatt plant 92 kilometer north of Amman) and Tafila (a 117-megawatt plant south 
of the Dead Sea that provides energy for approximately 83,000 homes). Solar power in Jordan is more 
developed with many smaller settlements and rural communities using off-grid photovoltaic systems 
for household use (electricity, water pumping and heating, for example) and a substantial number of 
private and public residential and business buildings are equipped with solar water heating systems. 
Highlights from the government’s current Energy Master Plan include a plan to ensure that up to one 
third of all residences in Jordan will have solar water heating systems by 2020; all mosques in the 
country are to be fitted with solar panels; and sea water desalination using solar power will be 
established.  
Even though Jordan’s renewable energy sector is expanding, King Abdullah II have strongly advocated 
the development of nuclear energy to meet Jordan’s needs in the coming decades. The nuclear energy 
policy began in earnest on the 1 April 2007 with the announcement by then-Energy Minister Khaled 
Sharida that Jordan was going to tender bids to build its first nuclear power plant to produce 
electricity. The program has since developed apace and the government now plans to build five 
nuclear reactors by 2040. Committee for Nuclear Strategy established in 2007 plans for nuclear energy 
to account for 30 per cent of the total energy mix by 2030, but with current production plans and 
estimations for energy demand, Jordan could produce almost half of its electricity demand in the 
coming decades by nuclear power.  
In 2015 the government signed an agreement with the Russian government to contract the latter’s 
Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation to build a US$10 billion twin reactor power plant. The plant 
is set to be completed by 2025 at which point it will supply Jordan with 2000 megawatts of electricity 
(out of an estimated total demand of 8000 megawatts). The nuclear energy program has been buoyed 
by the discovery of at least 40,000 tons of uranium ore in central Jordan (a figure that the Jordan 
Atomic Energy Commission estimates may be as high as 300,000 tons). It is anticipated that the 
excavation of this ore along with the operation of nuclear power plants will make the country more 
energy independent and secure by not having to entirely rely on external sources of energy. 
Freshwater scarcity 
As mentioned above, resource scarcity is a fundamental feature of Jordan’s political economy, and 
freshwater scarcity is the most pressing issue facing Jordanian decision-makers and ordinary citizens 
on a daily basis. Jordan’s freshwater supplies total approximately 1.62 billion cubic meters/year of 
internal and external renewable freshwater which equates to 123.4 cubic meters per person per year 
(down from around 164 cubic meters in the mid-2000s). Freshwater scarcity is worsened by the fact 
that the limited available resources are, for the most part, not sovereign and are instead shared with 
neighboring states. The Jordan River system, for example, is one of the most significant above-ground 
sources of freshwater and is shared with Israel and Palestine. The river’s over-use upstream has 
reduced its flow downstream to the extent that by August each year it has virtually dried-up before it 
reaches the Dead Sea. Since the 1960s, rapidly growing demand due to population growth and 
increased agricultural and industrial activity has resulted in the River’s over-exploitation (Venot et al., 
2008: 247-263). For Jordan’s part, the creation of a series of dams on the smaller tributaries has 
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unsustainably reduced the size and flow of the River and contributed to the lowering of the Dead Sea 
by up to a meter per year. This experience is being repeated across Jordan where above-ground and 
below-ground freshwater resources are being unsustainably exploited.  
The government does seem to acknowledge that current practices are leading to the exhaustion of 
available freshwater sources (many of which are non-renewable) yet given the severe shortage of this 
resource and the already well-below global average consumption of freshwater, there seems little 
option but to seek ways of making freshwater consumption more efficient and finding alternative 
supplies. Through the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, the government has developed a set of policy 
responses to its freshwater scarcity problem. Some policies are entirely domestic in focus and center 
on increasing efficiency of use and maximizing the availability of existing freshwater sources in Jordan. 
These have a direct impact on both household and private sector consumption practices. For example, 
since the mid-2000s the government has increased efforts to improve wastewater management and 
re-use. By collaborating with national and foreign private sector actors the government has developed 
the use of modern technologies to collect and treat wastewater from urban, industrial and domestic 
use. The Wastewater Management Policy calls for the use of treated wastewater rather than unused 
freshwater for agricultural and industrial processes, freeing up higher quality freshwater sources for 
domestic and urban use.   
In a similar approach to Jordan’s energy security problems, the government is also developing long-
term and large-scale infrastructural projects to increase its freshwater supply. Central to these plans 
is the principle of maximizing sovereign control of these freshwater sources. Two central tenets are 
evident in these plans: firstly, the exploitation of large underground aquifers, and desalination of sea 
water to produce freshwater. In the case of the former, the Disi Aquifer water conveyance project is 
useful to consider and the Aquifer is in the south of Jordan and stretches underneath the border with 
Saudi Arabia. It is an ancient fossilized aquifer and Jordan’s share, as agreed with Saudi Arabia, is an 
estimated 2.2 billion cubic meters of freshwater. The conveyance project was inaugurated in 2013 and 
consists of a pipeline system with pumping stations to take the freshwater from the south up to 
Amman and its surroundings. The project cost over US$1.1 billion to complete and supplies Amman 
with 100,000 cubic meters of freshwater per year. Turkey’s GAMA, a large private sector construction 
firm, constructed the project given a lack of technical know-how and capabilities in the Jordanian 
private sector. It must be noted that as a fossilized aquifer and a non-renewable source, and as such 
is does not represent a long-term solution to Jordan’s freshwater scarcity problem.  
The government’s focus on desalination of sea water may offer a more sustainable response. As part 
of the 1994 Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan an integrated plan for the development of the 
Jordan Rift Valley was agreed upon. This plan included the creation of a water conveyance system to 
take sea water from the Red Sea at the Gulf of Aqaba, desalinate it and pump freshwater to the main 
population centers in Jordan, Israel and the West Bank. This plan has not materialized, however, there 
has been a great deal of groundwork completed to date. Feasibility studies have been completed, 
design plans have been developed and funding sought. Given the political tensions that remain 
between Israel and Palestine and the failure to fully normalize relations between Jordan and Israel, 
the multilateral project has largely stalled. In its place, Jordan has begun construction on its own, 
somewhat smaller, project which consists of a sea water intake at Aqaba, a desalination facility with 
a projected capacity of 65-85 million cubic meters per year, a conveyance system and hydropower 
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plant (to help power the energy-intensive desalination process). While the desalination of sea water 
will add to Jordan’s overall energy demand, the government sees the sustainable domestic production 
of freshwater as essential to the country’s future.   
Neoliberal economic policies 
In the 1970s and 1980s King Hussein was slightly hesitant to implement neoliberal economic reforms 
and preferred instead to balance capitalism with a form of Arabist patrimonialism. He was also never 
particularly focused on economic policies, dedicating his adept abilities towards foreign policy (Shlaim, 
2008: 63-64). Yet, at times he played a pivotal role in domestic economic affairs when needed and he 
was eventually encouraged to adopt neoliberal economic policies bringing the economy more in-line 
with global capitalist practices. This move came with the collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s and 
the subsequent economic downturn in Jordan. In the 1980s, much like today, the economy relied 
substantially on worker remittances, investments, aid and other forms of financial support from the 
hydrocarbon-rich Gulf monarchies (Robins, 2004: 141-146). When the price of oil declined so too did 
the flow of financial resources coming into Jordan from these states.  
By 1989 the budget crisis had worsened to the extent that Jordan had defaulted on its international 
debt repayments leading King Hussein to approve the implementation of a Structural Adjustment 
Program (SAP) demanded by the IMF in order to receive financial support to help Jordan balance its 
books. This SAP signaled the embedding of neoliberal economic policies and in effect, King Hussein 
had set the path towards neo-classical economic policies, and these have shaped the economy ever 
since. Since 1999 King Abdullah II has deepened economic neo-liberalization and unlike his father who 
approached policy-making in a more creative manner, relying on charisma and his own experiences, 
King Abdullah II has placed more emphasis on neo-liberal economic practices inspired in part by the 
time he spent being educated and working in the UK and the US before his ascension, and by a range 
of Jordanian and foreign advisors. Under his reign successive Jordanian governments have advocated 
making Jordan a business-friendly environment and encouraging businesses to become more 
competitive to help the Kingdom to modernize, industrialize and develop into a more prosperous and 
affluent society.  
During the first decade of his reign, King Abdullah II proposed several economic reforms that built on 
the neoliberal project begun in the latter stages of his father’s reign. Since 1999 there have been three 
main thrusts of neoliberal economic reform pursued in Jordan (Knowles, 2005: 163-205);these are, 
macro-economic structural adjustment; privatization of national assets; and liberalization of foreign 
trade. Macro-economic restructuring has largely been guided by SAPs designed by the IMF and World 
Bank as part of the conditions for financial assistance to Jordan. These adjustments have allowed 
Jordan to service its external debt, although overall debt remains high at US$27.72 billion (2017), 
equivalent to over 86 per cent of GDP. Jordan is committed to reducing its external debt and under 
King Abdullah II further economic restructuring has taken place to pursue this goal.  
Unlike the SAP and macro-economic reforms implemented in the early 1990s which sought economic 
stability rather than growth, more recent policy reforms have aimed at achieving the latter. Reducing 
national subsidies for food and fuel and replacing them with subsidization that targets those most in 
need of it, for example, has allowed the government to reduce its budget deficit while at the same 
time promote local market growth through higher profits for food and fuel producers. The 
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government has traditionally maintained relatively high rates of subsidization for fuel (primarily 
petroleum) and basic foods (in particular, bread through wheat flour subsidies) for all consumers. In 
recent years petroleum subsidies cost Jordan between 6.8 per cent (2007) and 8.8 per cent (2012) of 
the government budget, while food subsidies have approximately accounted for a further 18.9 per 
cent (2005) and 3.8 per cent (2010) of the budget. In early 2018 the government ended subsidies on 
flour in order to help stabilize the country’s finances. The price of bread products subsequently 
increased by 60-100% in the first quarter of 2018. Fuel subsidies were cancelled in 2012 helping to 
lead to an increase of one third in fuel prices paid by consumers. Previous attempts at liberalizing 
Jordan’s government expenditures led to 1996’s ‘bread riots’ and a large number of anti-government 
demonstrations in 2011-2012. The privatization of government-owned enterprises and service 
industries has been wide-spread since the early 2000s and has helped the government to raise 
revenue to service external debt and to rebalance the role and scale of the public sector in the 
economy (El-Said and Becker, 2001). The Executive Privatization Commission was established in 1996 
to oversee the sale of national assets in several sectors, including construction, telecommunications, 
transport, energy and agriculture. Among the most important goals of the program have been 
increasing efficiency and productivity, attracting FDI and reducing the government’s role in the 
economy to that of a regulator. The privatization program has led to over 70 transactions, including 
the sale of the government’s shares in over 50 companies. By the end of 2017 the total proceeds of 
the privatization program are approximately US$3 billion, and total domestic and foreign investment 
has surpassed US$1 billion.  
In addition to designing SAPs, the IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO) have also 
encouraged the government to liberalize its foreign trade. Free trade has evidently been popular from 
the King down. Since the late 1990s Jordan has liberalized its foreign trade to attract investment, 
increase Jordanian exports and reduce domestic consumer prices. King Abdullah II has been a strong 
advocate of free trade and has overseen six main facets to the government’s program of trade 
liberalization: accession to the WTO in 2000; Jordan-Europe Free Trade Association free trade 
agreement (FTA) of 2002; Jordan-EU Association Agreement (JEUAA) of 2002; the implementation of 
the 1997 Greater Arab Free Trade Area agreement (GAFTA); Mediterranean Arab Free Trade Area 
agreement (MAFTA), also known as the Agadir Agreement of 2004; and several bilateral free trade 
agreements such as the Jordan-USA FTA (2000) (El-Anis, 2011), Jordan-Singapore FTA (2004), Jordan-
Turkey FTA (2011) and Jordan-Canada FTA (2012). Their impact on foreign trade has been mixed with 
gains seen in some sectors and with some trade partners (especially increases in textiles and apparel 
exports to the USA, pharmaceutical exports to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Libya, and increases in 
machinery imports from Germany, Italy and the USA), little change seen in other cases (Jordan’s 
Association Agreement with the EU, for example, has had limited impact with trade just under $4.2 
billion in 2007 and $5.8 billion in 2016), and declines in trade with some partners (for example, 
trade with Singapore declined from $132.86 million in 2015 to $118.3 million in 2016). On the whole, 
however, data from Jordan’s Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply shows that Jordan’s exports of 
textiles and clothing, pharmaceuticals and phosphates have increased dramatically, while its imports 
of machinery, transportation equipment and high-tech consumer products have also increased. Free 
marketeering has not resolved Jordan’s persistent trade deficit problem. It has, perhaps, contributed 
to it with the kingdom now running an annual trade deficit of just under US$10 billion in 2017. 
Table 2: Jordanian exports, imports and trade deficit values (US$) since 2000. 
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Year Exports (millions of 
USUS$) 
Imports (millions of 
USUS$) 
Deficit (millions of 
USUS$) 
1990 922 2581 1658 
1995 1444 3721 2277 
2000 1265 4597 3331 
2005 4301 10492 6191 
2010 5939 15562 9623 
2015 6757 20466 13709 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics database. http://www.imf.org/en/Data  
Conclusion  
Given the challenges facing Jordan’s political economy in the 21st century it is safe to say that it will 
remain a small state that will have to continue to respond to processes which are largely out of its 
control. From budgetary insecurity and high unemployment levels to energy security and freshwater 
scarcity, Jordan’s policy-makers as well as the ordinary citizen on the street will have to constantly 
create solutions to problems not necessarily of their making. Macro-economic restructuring and neo-
liberalization in Jordan have had mixed results and are not universally popular. While some have 
benefitted from the economic transformation of Jordan since the 1990s, many more have been left 
behind—an experience noticeable around the world, and demonstrated at the national level by 
Jordan’s budget and trade deficits. Poverty levels remain stubbornly high, per capita incomes have 
stagnated since 2008-2009, and Jordan’s youthful population is increasingly frustrated and restless 
due to a lack of job and other opportunities. Scarcity of the most important resources in Jordan is a 
long-term challenge and the government’s responses entail long-term and large-scale infrastructural 
projects which will not bear fruit for some time. And even when they do, growth in the demands for 
energy and freshwater, for example, may have surpassed even the most pessimistic current estimates 
leaving Jordan endlessly facing insecurity in these areas. Yet with all of these considerations in mind, 
the political economy of modern Jordan also tells that it is an enduring country, one that is faced with 
what may appear to be insurmountable obstacles, only for it to continue to survive and evolve. In 
some ways, therefore, the story of Jordan’s political economy is one of resilience as much as it is one 
of challenges.  
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